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1. Introduction
At least two main strands can be distinguished in the
design theory literature: that design is a knowledge-
based process; and that design is a learning process.
For example, SCHON (1988) has argued that the pat-
terns of inference shared among designers are not sig-
nificantly different from reasoning in everyday life.
What distinguishes designers is not some mystical abil-
ity but the accumulated knowledge the designer brings
to bear upon a problem. Others, such as BAZJANAC
(1974) have argued that design can be viewed as a
learning process in which the objective is one of under-
standing the structure of the problem. In this view de-
sign proceeds through a process of analysis-through-
synthesis in which the problem is explored through a
series of attempts to create solutions and understand
their implications in terms of design criteria. In this
paper we attempt to relate these two views of design
by showing that learning within and between design
problems is a necessary consequence of a knowledge-
based view of design. Drawing on work in artificial
intelligence, we develop a model of design as a knowl-
edge-based learning process based on the successive
refinement of a body of core heuristics and embed this
model within the abduction-deduction-induction
framework proposed by MARCH (1976).
In section 2 we discuss the nature of design prob-
lems. A design problem is characterised as as one in
which both the objectives and the means available for
achieving these objectives are (of necessity) initially
only poorly defined. In section 3 some observations
concerning the nature of the design process based on
this characterisation are presented, and it is argued
that the fundamental objective in design is one of un-
derstanding the structure of the problem. In section 4
the role of knowledge in this process is examined in
more detail and we argue that design can only proceed
through the development of new relationships and
strategies within the context of the current design
problem. In section 5 we investigate the nature of heu-
ristic rules in some detail. The range of an heuristic is
characterised as the task domain in which it is applica-
ble and we show that for any given set of heuristics
there exists (at least) one problem which cannot be
solved using these heuristics. In section 6 we present
an alternative view of the development and use of rela-
tionships in design based on these observations, which
focuses on the critical role of learning in design. The
idea of a set of 'core heuristics' is introduced and we
argue that the elaboration and adaption of these heu-
ristics can be seen as a simple model of this complex
process. Section 7 develops a model of this learning
process within the framework of the model of design
proposed by March based on the three logical opera-
tions of abduction, deduction and induction. In partic-
ular, we attempt to clarify the role of induction in the
formation of relationships between criteria and its re-
lationship to the process of theory formation. In the
final section we argue that despite its limitations, the
simple model outlined in the previous sections is useful
in gaining some insight into the role of learning in the
design process.
2. The nature of design problems
We begin by presenting our characterisation of design
problems in more detail. At its most general level, a
design problem is concerned with the production of a
description of an artefact or process which meets a giv-
en set of objectives or requirements. These require-
ments are often initially ill-defined and may be in con-
flict. In general they will not all be equally important;
legislative controls are often value free, whereas user
requirements may be modified during discussions with
the client, and constraints generated by the designer
may be extensively revised, or even abandoned alto-
gether during the design process (LAWSON, 1980).
However, the real difficulty is that these objectives can-
not easily be related to one another. LAWSON (1980)
states:
The relative importance of the various requirements
changes constantly during the design process as the de-
signer's value system is itself affected by the explora-
tion of objectives and what he finds to be possible.
The value judgments regarding 'trade-offs' between
criteria are therefore context dependent, and the bal-
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ance of satisfaction for such requirements may not be
clear until the designer explores the various possibili-
ties in appropriate detail. Such value judgments apply
not only to the «qualitative» criteria such as aesthet-
ics, but also to the relative importance of quantitative
criteria which themselves may be susceptible to objec-
tive measurement. Questions about which are the most
important problems and what kinds of solution most
successfully solve these problems are also value laden,
and the answers given by designers to these question
are therefore frequently subjective and highly context
dependent.
The nature of the «real» problem is thus often not
apparent but must be discovered; problems may sug-
gest certain features of solutions, but these solutions in
turn create new and different problems. The initial ex-
pression of the problem is often misleading, and de-
signers must typically expend considerable effort in
identifying the actual nature of the problem which
confronts them. Design problems have no obvious or
natural boundaries, but rather seem to be organised
roughly hierarchically. Many elements of the problem
cannot be expected to emerge until some attempt has
been made at generating solutions. Given the essential-
ly subjective nature of design it is inevitable that some
aspects of the problem will remain either unrecognised
or undeveloped for much of the design process. As a
result design problems are full of uncertainties both
about objectives and their relative priorities, and
both priorities and objectives are likely to change as
solutions emerge. SIMON (1973) calls such problems
«ill-structured» and argues that any problem with a
large base of potentially relevant knowledge falls into
this category. The design task is ill-structured in this
sense in a number of respects. There is initially no def-
inite criteria to test a solution, much less a formal proc-
ess to apply the criteria. In addition the problem space
cannot be completely defined due to a radical lack of
knowledge. Also, while the set of alternative solutions
may be given in a certain abstract sense, it is not given
in the only sense that is practically relevant. As a result
there can never be an exhaustive list of all the possible
solutions to such problems.
Design problems are therefore often multidimen-
sional and highly interdependent. It is rare for any part
of a design to serve only one purpose, and it is fre-
quently necessary to devise a solution which satisfies a
whole range of requirements. Design decisions may
have results other than those intended, which highlight
previously unrecognised criteria and relationships. In
many cases the stated objectives are in direct conflict
with one another and the designer cannot simply opti-
mise one requirement without suffering losses else-
where. For example, though enlarging a window may
well let in more light and give a better view, it will also
result in greater heat loss and may create greater prob-
lems of privacy. Different trade-offs between the crite-
ria result in a whole range of acceptable solutions, each
likely to prove more or less satisfactory in different
ways to different clients and users. It is the very inter-
relatedness of these factors which is the essence of de-
sign problems rather than the isolated factors them-
selves, and it is the structuring of relationships between
these criteria that forms the basis for the design proc-
ess (LAWSON, 1980). The fundamental objective thus
becomes one of understanding the structure of the
problem (rather than the solution), and analysing the
inter-relationships between criteria to gain some in-
sight into the relationships between each individual
design decision and all of the other decisions which to-
gether define the solution.
3. The nature of the design process
The designer's exploration of this structure begins with
the initial formulation of the problem. To a large ex-
tent, a design problem has no inherent structure; it ac-
quires structure as solutions are proposed and prob-
lems are reduced to subproblems. In a very real sense
the relationships between criteria can be seen as a func-
tion of the approach to design embodied in the pro-
posed solution rather than as inherent in the problem
itself. This initial formulation forms the basis of subse-
quent exploration of the problem.
Consider, for example, the problem of providing a
particular view from the living room in designing a
house.1 Such a requirement may have been specified in
the original problem description or it may have been
generated during the design process. In either case, an
architect might choose to formulate the associated de-
sign problem in terms of some standard solution, as a
problem of the arrangement of the living room and the
placement of a window in a way which will provide
the desired view from the relevant areas of the room.
Through such a formulation of the design problem the
1. This example is based on one given by BAZJANAC (1974).
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designer has also formulated the general form of the
solution; any particular design solution is determined
by a specific placement of the window and a specific
disposition of the living room. The designer then pro-
ceeds to explore the implications of this particular de-
sign decision. In doing so he or she may make further
design decisions and consider a number of design al-
ternatives. This process of exploration may lead to the
discovery that in providing the desired view it becomes
impossible to maintain the relationship between the
living area and the entrance to the house, or that
the basic structural system of the house will not
allow the positioning of a window of the required size
in the desired location. As a result the designer comes
to realise that the problem of providing a view from
the living room has other aspects and its solution may
involve finding a more appropriate layout for the
house on the site, or the redesign of the structural sys-
tem in a way which will accommodate the desired win-
dow. The formulation of both the problem and the so-
lution may therefore change as a consequence of an
attempt to solve a particular problem.
It might be argued that in this case the original for-
mulation of the problem was unrealistic and that an
experienced designer would approach the problem at a
more appropriate leve. However such an argument
misses the point. In trying to develop a solution to a
particular design problem even the most experienced
designer will gain new insights which necessitate the
redefinition of the problem and suggest alternative so-
lutions. The need to understand (at whatever level) the
details of a particular case and how they interact are in
a sense what makes a design problem a design problem.
As a solution develops it provides an increasingly
detailed context against which to test the designer's
hypotheses, and the evaluation of a proposal can re-
sult in the discovery of previously unrecognised rela-
tionships and criteria. In a sense later decisions are
constrained by earlier decisions in that they are taken
within the context of an existing partial solution, and
each decision further limits the range of possible alter-
natives. Solutions to particular subproblems are apt to
be disturbed or undone at a later stage when new as-
pects are attended to and the considerations leading to
the original solution are forgotten or not noticed. Such
side effects accompany all complex design processes.
As a result, while the final solution may satisfy all the
requirements that are evoked when it is tested, it may
violate some of the requirements that were imposed
(and temporarily satisfied) at an earlier stage in the
design. The designer may or may not be aware of these
violations. Other appropriate design criteria may sim-
ply remain dormant, never having been evoked during
the design process. The development of a design is thus
constrained by what best fits the knowledge the de-
signer has at that time.
The formulation of the problem at any stage is not
final; rather it reflects the designer's current under-
standing of the problem. As the design progresses the
designer learns more about possible problem and solu-
tion structures as new aspects of the situation become
apparent and the inconsistencies inherent in the for-
mulation of the problem are revealed. As a result, de-
signers gain new insights into the problem (and the so-
lution) which ultimately result in the formation of a
new view; the problem and the solution are redefined.
This process of exploration and redefinition continues
until one or more of the following conditions is met
(BAZJANAC, 1974):
- the incremental gain in knowledge has become
insignificant and the understanding of the problem
(and the solution) cannot change enough to warrant
further redefinition, (i.e. the designer has reached the
limits of his or her understanding); or
- the available resources (primarily time) have be-
come exhausted.
There is no meaningful distinction between analy-
sis and synthesis in this process; problems and solu-
tions are seen as emerging together rather than one log-
ically following from the other. The problem is
explored through a series of attempts to create solu-
tions and understand their implications in terms of
other criteria. The designer comes to understand the
critical relationships and possible forms as a solution
evolves. Between generic solutions planning is less a
search for the best solution than an exploration of the
compromises that give sufficient solutions. These ex-
plorations help the designer appreciate which require-
ments may be most readily achieved. As part of this
process, the designer learns which criterion values will
achieve the design requirements and how much varia-
tion of these values can be tolerated while still achiev-
ing acceptable performance, the implications of
achieving the current goal, and any other decisions re-
quired to make the attainment of these goals consist-
ent with the existing solution.
211
Understanding problem structure as heuristic formation in design
Learning more about the structure of the problem
is the most important part of this process. The funda-
mental objective becomes one of understanding the
structure of the problem, with a major part of the ef-
fort in design being directed towards structuring prob-
lems and only a fraction of it devoted to solving them
once they have been structured (SiMON, 1970). The de-
sign process can be viewed more generally as a process
of discovering information about problem structures
that will ultimately be valuable in developing possible
solutions.
4. Knowledge in design
The generation of solutions draws on an extensive
knowledge of design methods, strategies and solutions
to previous problems. Design proposals are not pro-
duced blindly but result from a general understanding
of the kinds of solutions which may be appropriate in
a given situation, and how these solutions may be pur-
sued. An important component of this knowledge is
what might be termed «compiled experience». The role
of a priori knowledge derived either from a familiarity
with related problems or, in the form of published
guides and standards, has been widely recognised in
studies of design. Foz (1972) has shown how explora-
tion of the problem evokes previously known solutions
from memory. These examples are used as «guides» or
«templates» for analysing or developing possible solu-
tions in terms of the problem requirements. AKIN
(1978) discusses the use of «problem transforma-
tions», which
make the current solution more specific, such as a
precompiled solution, an analogous solution, a generic
solution, etc. [...] if explicit transformations are not
possible at the time, use previous experience to assume
that certain aspects of the current solution can be fur-
ther specified.
More recently, Gero et al. (GERO, 1987; GERO, MA-
HER & ZHANG, 1988; OXMAN & GERO, 1988) have pro-
posed that design knowledge is stored and retrieved in
a series of abstract schemata called «prototypes»: 'gen-
eralised groupings of elements in a design domain [...]
from which instances of elements can be derived'.
These approaches to design may be broadly char-
acterised as «knowledge-based», in viewing the design
process as a series of problem transformations gov-
erned by «rules» or «codes» linking design solutions
and abstract requirements. There are clear parallels
between, for example, Foz's «templates», Akin's
«problem transformations» and Gero's concept of
«prototypes». Common to all these approaches is the
idea that design proceeds through the utilisation of an
organised body of a priori knowledge, which is used
both to structure and understand the design problem
and which forms the basis of design hypotheses. In this
view there exists at any given time a list of current
goals together with a (potentially very large) set of
heuristics, strategies, previous examples etc. embody-
ing a set perceived relationships between the solution
and criteria spaces. These relationships function as
«production rules», mapping a problem expressed in
terms of abstract requirements onto some solution or
class of solutions which satisfies these requirements.
The boundary between the criteria and solution spaces
moves to include as criteria solutions to previous prob-
lems, as the problems represented by the criteria are
reduced to sets of simpler subproblems whose solution
is known or which are at least easier to solve. This
process continues until no further reduction is possible
or until the resulting problem is deemed to be no long-
er the concern of the designer; e.g. the problem of how
to design a beam to support a given load or the prob-
lem of how to construct a wall of a given size in a giv-
en position.
STEADMAN (1979) has argued that in architectural
design this body of general or collective knowledge is
perpetuated through architectural education, architec-
tural journals and publications and the study of exist-
ing buildings. However it is not, with certain excep-
tions, of an organised, explicit or scientific nature.
Rather, empirical experience of a range of related de-
signs provides a body of knowledge and understand-
ing on the basis of which it is possible to build a gener-
alised theory (or theories) of a class of artefacts, which
is used to extrapolate, beyond the tried cases, to hypo-
thetical but related design yet to be constructed. It is
this body of knowledge, concerning, for example, the
relation of physical performance to shape, which in-
forms the creation of solutions.
However when we turn our attention to a detailed
consideration of these rules a major difficulty immedi-
ately becomes apparent. Design, by its nature, is large-
ly concerned with the specification of objects that are
unique. (If an object already exists which is recognised
212
Brian Logan
as satisfactorily achieving all the design goals there is
by definition no design problem.) The question then
arises: how can any necessarily finite collection of rela-
tionships cope with the infinite variety of possible de-
sign problems? Or, more precisely, what happens when
no rule can be found which is appropriate to the cur-
rent problem?
A complete answer tot his question is impossible
given our current understanding of the design process,
however we shall attempt to develop a small part of
such an answer in the remainder of this paper. Briefly,
we shall argue that, in general, design can only pro-
ceed through the development of new relationships
and strategies within the context presented by the de-
sign problem. In the remainder of this paper we present
a model of the development and application of design
knowledge based on the successive refinement of a set
of heuristic rules and embed this model within the mod-
el of the design process proposed by MARCH (1976).
5. The nature of heuristics
An heuristic is a process or procedure that may solve a
problem, but offers no guarantee of doing so (NEWELL,
SHAW &c SIMON, 1963). The study of heuristics as a sep-
arate discipline effectively began with POLYA (1945),
who traced its origins back to Liebniz, Descartes and
even Pappus. More recently Pospelov and PUSHKIN
(1972) have tried to define the field as «the science
which studies the laws governing the design of new
actions in new situations». In the main, experience has
tended to come from fields other than design, most
notably mathematics (ÜAVIS & HERSH, 1980; POLYA,
1945), and artificial intelligence (LENAT, 1982). De-
spite the major differences in subject matter and ap-
proach, we shall argue that the results of these studies
are of relevance to design.2 The material in this section
draws on the work of LENAT (1982; 1983¿z; 19836).
Below we present a summary of Lenat's work and in
subsequent sections we attempt to develop these ideas
and relate them to the design activity.
LENAT (1982) argues that the power of heuristics
results from a kind of two dimension continuity over
situations and actions:
li an heuristic H was (or would have been) useful in
situation S then it is likely that heuristics similar to H
will be useful in situations similar to S.
In other words, if we could somehow graph the func-
tion appropriateness (action, situation), that function
would be continuous in both variables and vary very
slowly. This is obviously an idealisation; there are
many ways of characterising situations (the problem
domain, the difficulty of the problem, the time availa-
ble for its solution, etc.) and many measures of appro-
priateness (the quality of the resulting solution, the
computational cost of using the heuristic, etc.) with the
result that we can do little more than estimate the util-
ity of a particular action on a few criteria in a small
number of situations. Nevertheless, Lenat argues that
this assumption underlies much of the utility of heuris-
tics in problem-solving and that it is often useful to
behave as though the assumption were true, i.e. to be-
have as though it were true that the function appropri-
ateness (action, situation) exists and is continuous and
time-invariant.
Lenat develops several corollaries of this assump-
tion:
Corollary 1: If an action A is appropriate in a situ-
ation S, then A is also appropriate in most situations
which are very similar to S.
For a given action, its appropriateness is a continu-
ous function of the situation. If the situation changes
only slightly then the judgement as to which actions
are appropriate changes only slightly. This is the basic
justification for reasoning by analogy; if something
worked in a similar situation in the past, it is likely that
it will work in the current problem.
Corollary 2: If an action A is appropriate in a situ-
ation S, then so are most actions which are very simi-
lar to A.
For a given situation, appropriateness is a continu-
ous function of actions. If an action is particularly use-
ful (or harmful) in some situation, it is likely that any
very similar action will have similar consequences. This
is the basic justification for «satisficing», of accepting a
solution which is «good enough»; given that any simi-
lar action will, in general, have similar consequences, it
is not worth searching for an optimal answer.
2. Note that in doing so we do not wish to adopt a «realist»
position with respect to design rules. We are not implying that
the «rules» used by designers can be made explicit or even that
such rules exist: only that the behaviour of designers can be mod-
elled using such rules.
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Corollary 3: If an action A would have been appro-
priate in a situation S, then the rule «If the current sit-
uation is similar to S then try A» may be useful in the
future.
It is cost effective to form and use heuristics which
would have helped in the past. This is basic justifica-
tion for the utility of memory. If we conclude (via hind-
sight) that a rule would have been useful in the past
then is likely that it will be of use in the future.
In the remainder of this paper we attempt to extend
this framework to design. We begin by considering the
nature of heuristics in more detail.
5.1. The power of individual heuristics
A situation is a description of a problem or task: a list
of goals together with the set of constraints, back-
ground assumptions and any existing partial solution
which forms the context of the problem. For a body of
heuristics to be effective in guiding action, each heuris-
tic must specify those situations in which its action/s
are especially appropriate or inappropriate. We can
view an heuristic as a simple production rule of the
form:
if (condition) then (action)
If the condition is true (or approximately true) in
the current situation then the action may be an appro-
priate one to try. Such rules may be either analytic or
synthetic. For example, if the task is to design a beam
capable of supporting a given load, the heuristic would
be thought of as synthetic. Conversely, if the objective
is to predict the heating energy requirements of a pro-
posed design the heuristic would be thought of as ana-
lytic. In both cases there are a variety of approaches
which could be used, ranging from rules of thumb to
sophisticated finite element methods. More generally,
there are also rules which are useful in less well defined
situations; for exemple, what kind of structural system
to use given the type of building and the cost con-
straints, or the evaluation of the layout of a building
given the design requirements and the characteristics
of the site.
Each heuristic will be more or less useful in a given
situation. The utility of an heuristic is zero in some sit-
uations (where the heuristic is not considered relevant,
i.e. the condition is false) and is more or less positive in
others (where the condition is true).3 A problem can be
characterised in many different ways (e.g. the scope of
the problem, the degree of difficulty, the resources
available for a solution etc. —including the context of
any partial solution which might exist). A given prob-
lem can be identified with a particular set of values on
each of the situation dimensions. Naively we might
classify problems into easy problems and hard prob-
lems or structures problems and environmental prob-
lems for example. Similarly, there are many different
ways of characterising the utility of an heuristic (e.g.
its reliability, the resources required to perform the ac-
tion, etc.). Each heuristic will have a particular level of
utility on each utility dimension for a given problem.
For example, in a given situation a particular heuristic
might be quick to apply but unreliable. Note that while
there may appear to be an overlap —the speed with
which a solution is required vs. the speed with which a
solution is produced for example— these dimensions
are distinct. Situation dimensions characterise the
problem whereas utility dimensions characterise the
heuristic.4 If there are « utility dimensions and m situa-
tion dimensions then the utility of an heuristic on a
given utility dimension can be represented by a point
in an n + m dimensional space. For a given problem we
will be at some point on each of the situation axes
situation\-m and the utility of an heuristic on some util-
ity measure utilitji is given by
utility i = fu (heuristic, situation\-m)
For any pair of utility and situation dimensions
(utilityi, situation^ and some assignment of values to
the remaining situation dimensions we can imagine
3. Lenat argues that the utility of an heuristic can be nega-
tive in some situations, i.e. the heuristic appears to be relevant
(the condition matches the situation) but is in fact counterpro-
ductive —it gives the «wrong» or a poor solution, or takes long-
er than alternative approaches etc. depending on the utility
dimension being considered. However this implies a normative
theory of utility, and it is not clear from Lenat's argument where
the zero point should be located. Assuming that we have utility
axes at all, it is simpler for all utilities to be positive with axes
ordered as required (e.g. lower cost = greater utility).
4. We could chose to view the range of situations in which
an heuristic is applicable as a kind of utility, with those heuris-
tics applicable in a wider range of situations having greater util-
ity. However this would obscure certain aspects of the argument.
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graphing the utility of an heuristic on the dimension
utility¡ for varying values of situation/. For n utility di-
mensions and m task dimensions there are n x m such
power curves for each heuristic. Note that in many cas-
es this will be a constant function. For example, while
the reliability of an heuristic might be expected to de-
pend on the problem demain or the degree of difficul-
ty, it is unlikely to be affected by the time available for
a solution.
The utility of an heuristic in any given situation is a
function of both the utility of the condition and the
utility of the action
where
utilitji = f u (utilitjic, utili
utility ¡c = f c (condition, situation\-n
utility ¡a = fa (action, situation\-m]
If, for example, both the condition and the action
of an heuristic have an associated cost in time or re-
sources and an associated reliability then the total cost
of using the heuristic will be the cost of evaluating the
condition (to find out if the situation is of the right
type) plus the cost of performing the action, whereas
the overall reliability of the heuristic may be the prod-
uct of the reliability of the condition and the reliability
of the action. An heuristic such as «If the problem is
like one we have solved previously, then copy or adapt
the previous solution» may have high utility (e.g. low
cost or high reliability) for «typical» problems. The
overall cost of the heuristic will depend on the cost of
the search for the previous solution (the condition) and
the cost of copying or adapting that solution (the ac-
tion). The reliability of the heuristic will be some func-
tion of the reliability of the search (e.g. the percentage
of previous solutions examined, or the failure to notice
significant differences between the previous situation
and the current problem) and the reliability of adapt-
ing the previous solution (e.g. were any irrelevant de-
tails carried over from the previous solution?).
Estimating the utility of a condition is often diffi-
cult. While it may be possible to determine the cost of
evaluating a condition, it is often much harder to esti-
mate its reliability in selecting the intended set of situ-
ations. This is essentially the utility of planning, of de-
termining how much time or resources should be
allocated to deciding what to do next —how long to
spend classifying the situation, or searching for ways
in which the current situation is similar to or different
from previously encountered situations. The utility of
planning varies both with the difficulty of the problem
and cost of the proposed action. For trivial problems,
planning may be largely a waste of time (almost any
heuristic will solve the problem); however for complex
problems or in situations where there are many inter-
acting problems planning may be essential to avoid
wasted effort. Estimating the anticipated utility of an
action in a given situation is also often difficult. The
estimate of utility may be based simply on the subjec-
tive experience —how many times has the action been
successful in similar situations in the past— or it may
be some measure of the cost of performing the action
in time or resources. If an action has frequently been
successful in similar situations in the past, it may be a
good heuristic to try in the current situation (depend-
ing on other factors such as the time required to per-
form the action against the time available to solve the
problem). On the other hand if it is only occasionally
successful, but on those occasions where it did succeed,
it produced a «good» solution and is easy to apply, it
may still be worth trying.5
We can trade-off utility between the condition and
action to achieve a given level of utility for the heuris-
tics as a whole. For example, in solving structures
problems the heuristics «Always use finite element
methods» and «Identify those situations in which sim-
pler analytic methods may be used» may produce an
equally «good» solution in the same amount of time.
However, in general, a good heuristic is one in which
there is a high degree of overlap between those situa-
tions where the condition has high utility and those sit-
uations where the action has high utility. If the two sets
only partially overlap, the resulting heuristic will be
unreliable —in some situations it will be successful
while in others it will fail (e.g. take too long or pro-
duce the «wrong» answer). If the two sets of situations
are disjoint the resulting heuristic will have low or zero
utility even if the condition and action are themselves
successful. As the cost of the proposed action in time
or resources increases, so it becomes worthwhile
spending more time deciding which approach to
5. If on the other hand it is expensive to apply, it also sug-
gests that it may be worth trying to isolate the characteristics of
those situations in which it was successful. Such heuristics about
generating heuristics are discussed in more detail below.
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adopt.6 Finite element methods are applicable to most
structural design problems, but they are cost effective
only in those situations where simpler methods are
unavailable and careful consideration is often given as
to whether the problem is one which requires such
methods.
5.2. The space of heuristics
In reality, of course, a designer will draw on a wide
range of heuristics in solving any given problem. In
general a set of heuristics will have higher utility than
any of its members considered in isolation. Different
heuristics are applicable in different situations and us-
ing several heuristics in combination may be more ef-
fective than any single heuristic, for example if the ac-
tion of one heuristic matches the condition of another.
However the overall utility of a set of heuristics is not
simply the sum of the utilities of the individual heuris-
tics. The interactions between heuristics are often quite
strong and independence is the exception rather than
the rule. Often two heuristics will be different methods
of achieving the same result and the overall utility of
the set is not greatly increased by having both of them
present.7 While heuristics sometimes interact synergys-
tically, it is often the case that there are several inter-
nally consistent but mutually inconsistent sets of heu-
ristics within the total set. Using only heuristics from
one of these sets will result in a consistent solution to
the problem, but unstructured use of heuristics from
different sets results in inconsistencies within the solu-
tion. Such interactions are common in domains such
as design, where the attempt to achieve a particular
requirement often generates problems elsewhere. SI-
MON (1973) argues that good heuristics are those
which minimise such interactions and that part of
learning to be a designer is learning which approaches
to solving the problem are mutually consistent.
Using a particular heuristic in a given situation con-
strains which other heuristics can be employed in the
new situation which results. As in a game of chess, any
particular move in a given situation constrains futures
moves. In theory, there is, in any given situation, a best
possible move, which can be found by exhaustive enu-
meration of all possible moves and countermoves from
the current position. Similarly, in any given design sit-
uation, we can imagine computing the «global utility»
of an heuristic such that the heuristic with the highest
global utility ultimately leads to the best overall solu-
tion achievable in the current situation. Note that
«best» here means best on all utility dimensions
(weighted for the relative importance of each utility
dimension) as these appear in the context of the com-
pleted design, i.e. modified by the designer's increased
understanding of what is possible and the implications
of the various alternatives. Computing such a global
utility is obviously impossible —it would involve the
exhaustive enumeration of all designs possible in the
current situation (i.e. all possible designs, including
backtracking and the abandonment of the current par-
tial solution)— and would require a well defined space
of possible designs. Each individual design decision
must be made in the context of the problem as a whole.
This context includes both the problem specification
and the rest of the design solution —both those deci-
sions made to date and those that will be made in the
future, as the decision not only has to satisfy the cur-
rent goals it must continue to satisfy them in the con-
text of the final solution when all of the remaining de-
cisions have been made. Not only is the set of future
decisions undefined but the part which is defined, the
current problem definition, will change during the
course of the design as it is modified by the designer's
increased understanding of the implications of the cur-
rent solution. Like chess programs, designers must
work with essentially local information and any esti-
mate of the utility of an action is typically limited to
the immediate consequences of that action.
More generally the underlying structure of the
space of heuristics —the number and type of heuristics
and the concepts they relate— depends on how the
space of concepts is conceptualised into problems. We
can associate with each heuristic one or more domains,
or «sets of problems», for which the heuristic has non-
zero utility, where «domain» is defined as a range of
values for the problem dimensions of subject matter,
complexity, time available for solution etc., which to-
gether bound a region of the problem space. The set of
situations (defined as a range of values for each situa-
tion dimension) for which a heuristic achieves some giv-
en level of utility on each utility dimension is given by
6. Unless, of course, there are no alternative approaches
available. In such a situation, the risk of failure increases dra-
matically.
7. However the redundancy provided by multiple heuristics
can be important in the (consistent) attainment of multiple goals.
216
Brian Logan
situationi-m = fj (heuristic, utility\-n)
Conversely, the set of heuristics appropriate to a
given problem or set of problems (i.e. to a domain) is
given by
heuristic = ft, (utility\-n, situation\-m)
To solve any given problem, it is necessary to find
an heuristic which has satisfactory performance on all
of the relevant utility axes. In other words, given a
minimum performance level for each utility dimension
and the position of the problem on each of the situa-
tion dimensions, the set of heuristics relevant to this
problem lie within the hypervolume defined by the sit-
uation/utility parameters.
The set of heuristics associated with each domain
can be thought of as being in some sense relevant to
the set of problems which constitute the domain (and
all its subsets) in having non-zero utility for that set of
problems. Domains do not partition the space of con-
cepts —in a sense everything is linked to everything
else. Rather, they are largely conceptual devices for
structuring our consideration of the problem. For ex-
ample, it is unlikely that in general a detailed consider-
ation of window type will be required in general lay-
out planning, although it may be. LENAT (1982) argues
that one of the major tasks in mastering any domain is
learning the proper level/s at which to state and use
heuristic knowledge. If the heuristics are too small
their domain of application becomes too narrow to
make them worth remembering relative to the range of
problems associated with the domain. They stop being
meaningful pieces of knowledge and risk having many
stray interactions.
A problem, such as «scheme design» or the «design
of a structural system», can be seen as a meta-level
name of a set of object-level concepts.8 The problem
of, for example, «designing a structural system» or,
more generally, of «structural design», can be viewed
as the problem of finding some relationship between a
structure and a set of elements comprising that struc-
ture; where «structure» and «elements» are variables
ranging over possible structures and elements respec-
tively, that is, over subsets of the set of structural con-
cepts. The task of «solving a problem» becomes one of
relating a set of goal concepts to some, as yet unspeci-
fied, set of hypotheses. While the set of possible hy-
potheses does not form part of the current problem
description, the set of possible or candidate concepts
from which the hypotheses are constructed is known
in some sense through experience of similar problems.
It is this set of relevant concepts which forms the prob-
lem «field» or domain, and which an heuristic at-
tempts to structure by partitioning it into the (sub)set
of concepts which will form part of the current solu-
tion, and those that will not. Heuristics can be seen as
structuring relationships between sets of concepts (be-
tween sets of «wholes» and «parts» or «causes» and
«effects»), and hence the relationships between heuris-
tics —viewed as meta-level relationships such as more-
general-than, more powerful-than— are largely deter-
mined by the resulting partitioning of the space of
concepts into problems. A corollary of this is that the
way problems are seen in large part determines the way
in which they will be solved.
5.3. The space of situations
Different heuristics will have different utilities in a giv-
en situation. If an heuristic has lower utility than an-
other on all utility measures in all situations then we
say the first heuristic is dominated by the second.
Clearly such a set is context dependent. New ap-
proaches are always being discovered which are (or are
perceived to be) better in some respect than those they
replace. However for any given set of heuristics (repre-
senting some understanding of the world or level of
problem solving ability) it is possible to extract the
non-dominated subset. Such heuristics can be thought
of as the «best available». This is clearly an idealisa-
tion, however nothing hinges on it and it simplifies the
presentation.
Within such a set of non-dominated heuristics there
is a trade-off between generality and power. An in-
crease in utility along any given utility dimensions (e.g.
one with a better chance of success) can only be
acheived by using an heuristic which has lower utility
on some other dimension (e.g. it is more expensive), or
is aplicable to a narrower range of problems, or both.
What seems powerful or efficient in a general context
becomes less remarkable in comparison with heuristics
of similar range. A more general heuristic applicable
8. The term «problem» as used here refers to the class of
problems associated with a given domain independent of any
particular goal or set of goals.
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over a wider range of problems generally has a lower
utility for any given problem while more specific heu-
ristics with higher utility are limited to a narrower
range of problems.' This much seems borne out by eve-
ryday experience —there are no all-powerful problem
solving strategies which are applicable in all situations
or to all problems. If we take the range of an heuristic
to be its domain, then its total utility —defined as the
multiple integral of all the power curves of the heuris-
tic— is limited and depends on the relative importance
of (or more accurately the trade-off between) each of
the utility axes in the context of the current problem/
solution. The total utility of an heuristic,«(is given by
u, = ¡Wi
where «, is utility on the »-th utility measure and u>¡ is
the weight or relative importance of that utility meas-
ure in the current context. Whether a gain or loss on
any particular utility dimension represents an increase
in total utility depends on its implications for other di-
mensions. For example, for a very good solution, cost
may be less important.10
LENAT (1982) argues that in any given situation we
should apply the most powerful heuristic available
first and only resort to those with lower utility if the
initial attempts to solve the problem fail. Of course it
is unlikely we would know the power of an heuristic
precisely in each possible situation. It is more likely
that we would have some knowledge of the average
power of each heuristic, and would use that as a guess
of how useful each one would be in the current situa-
tion. If we assume that all heuristics are non-dominat-
ed, this corresponds to trying the most specific heuris-
tic first, followed by the next most specific and so on.
More importantly, the trade-off between generality
and power means that for any given set of heuristics,
there exist problems which cannot be solved using
those heuristics. That this is so can easily be demon-
strated simply by selecting a problem which is suffi-
ciently difficult relative to the domain of the heuristics.
The existence of such problems does not necessarily
present any difficulties for an heuristic-based model of
design, so long as most design problems can be solved
using the available heuristics. This is after all what we
would expect; heuristics are derived from experience
with previously encountered problems. However, we
shall argue that many if not most design problems can-
not be solved using the available heuristics. This ap-
parently paradoxical conclusion —that most design
problems cannot be solved using existing design knowl-
edge— is a consequence of the generality vs. power ar-
gument.
There are an infinite number of design problems
associated with any given domain, differing on one or
more of the situation dimensions, or the minimum util-
ity required on any given utility dimension, or the rela-
tive importance the designer assigns to these utilities.
We can imagine that a typical heuristic will be capable
of solving some non-trivial percentage of the problems
associated with its domain if it is to be worth remem-
bering in the first place. However, while the set of heu-
ristics associated with a domain may typically be suc-
cessful in solving many of the problems occurring
within that domain, each design decision must be
made in the context of the design problem as a whole.
The interaction between criteria which we have argued
is a defining characteristic of design problems means
that, in general, the effective domain of an heuristic is
the design problem as a whole, and this can vary in
many more ways than the putative domain of the heu-
ristic. For example, the range of situation dimensions
may be extended to include «problems in which heu-
ristic 101 has already been employed» or utility meas-
ures normally falling outwith the domain of the sub-
problem such as «adequate utility on utility dimension
ux (in a problem in which heuristic 101 has already
been employed)». This does not imply that the total
utility of each heuristic must somehow be increased. In
many, but not all problems, the attainment of adequate
utility on utility dimension ux will be irrelevant to solv-
ing problems in the given domain. Rather there are
many more ways the total utility of an heuristic might
be distributed within the situation/utility space. Each
9. In some circumstances the utility axis may have some ab-
solute desirable point along it, e.g. some guarantee of correct-
ness or efficiency. If an heuristic exceeds this value (even if only
over a relatively narrow range of tasks) the way we view the heu-
ristic may change; for example, we may term it «algorithmic» or
«real time». From this viewpoint algorithms are merely heuris-
tics which have sufficiently high utility for guarantees to be made
concerning their use, albeit in a restricted set of situations. Con-
versely, one can try to apply an algorithm outside its domain of
applicability, in which case the result may be useful and the algo-
rithm is then used as an heuristic (LENAT, 1982).
10. A belief held by many architectural students.
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unique distribution requires a unique heuristic.11 An
heuristic capable of producing the «right» solution in
all these situations would have to have high utility
on all the relevant situation dimensions, but this is im-
possible because the total utility of an heuristic is lim-
ited. It has significant utility only because it is special-
ised to a small range of problems. If this is so, the
question then arises: given that the total utility of an
heuristic is limited, how many heuristics would be re-
quired for us to be sure of being able to assemble a
consistent set which solves the problem?
The total utility associated with an heuristic may
be distributed in a number of different ways. For ex-
ample, some heuristics may be very good for a small
range of problems while others are of lower utility but
are appropriate in a wider range of situations. If we
assume that an heuristic must have some non-trivial
level of utility on some utility dimensions to count as
any sort of solution to a problem, then the number of
heuristics required to solve the range of problems no-
tionally occurring «in» a given domain will typically
be quite large. For example, if the total utility of non-
dominated heuristics tends towards a constant, then
for any given level of utility relative to some domain
the number of heuristics required to completely cover
the problem space will be a function of the power of
the level of utility required: doubling the utility re-
quired on all utility dimensions increases the number
of heuristics required by a factor of 2", etc.12 Since
there are many ways in which the situation can vary
(i.e. the set of typical problems is large) and the vol-
ume of an heuristic is limited, it seems unlikely that an
appropriate heuristic will be available at all stages of
the design process. Note that this argument applies at
all levels of abstraction from layout to detail design if
we consider the power of an heuristic relative to its
domain.
The more inter-dependent the criteria are, the
greater the number of heuristics required to solve any
given problem. Even if we assume, as seems likely, that
problems are not uniformly distributed along the utili-
ty and situation axes, the number of possible problems
is still very large. We would therefore require a corre-
sponding number of heuristics to be sure of solving a
typical design problem selected at random from a do-
main. Leaving aside the problem of simply remember-
ing this set of heuristics (for each domain) we are left
with the difficulty of explaining how such a set could
ever arise. If heuristics are derived from experience
with a range of problems, knowledge of such a set
would seem to imply experience of all possible prob-
lems. If, as seems likely, this is impossible, we are
forced to conclude that we can never have enough
rules to be sure of solving any given problem.13
If a suitable heuristic cannot be found, the criteria
are deemed to be inconsistent, i.e. no solution exists
within the solution space defined by the heuristics.
This happens when no way can be found of achieving
a particular requirement or set of requirements within
the constraints imposed by the rest of the solution con-
text. This may either be because while the available
heuristics are capable of achieving their immediate
goals, the resulting «local» solutions have unaccepta-
ble consequences elsewhere (solutions can be found for
each of the sub-problems considered in isolation, but
these partial solutions are mutually inconsistent), or
because no way can be found of achieving a particular
goal even in the absence of other constraints (the prob-
lem lies outwith the scope of any known heuristic).
Such conflicts are common in design, indeed we have
identified the existence of conflicts between criteria as
one of the characteristics of design problems (LoGAN
& SMITHERS, 1989). In such a situation the designer
must either modify the problem, i.e., relax one or more
constraints until the current solution meets the revised
design requirements, or modify the means available to
solve the problem by modifying an existing heuristic
or creating a new heuristic. (In many situations, it will
be necessary to modify both the requirements descrip-
tion and the available problem solving strategies to
achieve a consistent solution.) Often when we start
solving a problem, the criteria are inconsistent. When
we are finished, the solution and criteria are consistent
either because we relaxed the criteria or because we
11. Note that this rules out the possibility of generating an
infinite number of solutions by simply combining «standard»
heuristics associated with each domain.
12. This assumes that all problem dimensions are equally
important and that there is a uniform distribution of problems
within the domain. However in reality it is likely that some will
be more important than others and in some cases (e.g. problems
of extreme difficulty) there may be no heuristics available.
13. Even if such a set of heuristics existed, the problem of
finding the «right» heuristic to solve the current sub-problem
remains. As we saw in section 5.2, while heuristics are evaluated
on their global utility, they are of necessity selected on their local
utility as part of the design context is unavailable when the deci-
sion to use the heuristic is taken.
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found a new way to solve the problem which satisfies
the goals. Problems which were perceived as inconsist-
ent or contradictory cease to seem so.
6. Heuristic formation and learning in design
The results outlined in the previous section, i.e. the
need for domain specific heuristics and the existence
of problems which cannot be solved using a given set
of heuristics, are both consequences of the generality
vs. power argument.14 Yet problems are solved and
there is considerable evidence from cognitive psychol-
ogy and design research that designers do use some
form of prestructures or relationships to structure and
solve their problems. In an attempt to explain this par-
adox we present an alternative view of the develop-
ment and use of prestructures in design which accom-
modates these observations and theoretical results, and
illuminates the critical role of the learning process in
design.
Design problems by definition are unique. We have
argued that it is unlikely, given the large number of cri-
teria which form the definition of a design problem,
that any given problem will be identical to a previous-
ly solved problem. However in general the designer
will have solved similar problems in the past and will
use this experience as a guide in solving the current
problem. We hypothesise that there exists a set of
«core» heuristics associated with each domain which
have shown themselves to be useful in the past and
worth remembering, and that these core heuristics are
adapted (to a greater or lesser extent) to the problem
at hand. For each problem domain, such as layout de-
sign, structural design, materials selection, detailing,
etc. whatever its level of abstraction, there is a colec-
tion of rules of thumb, typical examples and relation-
ships which provide a more or less powerful heuristic
core for that domain, and which are adapted to the
details of any given problem.
The set of heuristics is constantly being adapted to
new problems and situations, and the core heuristics
are continuously refined through experience gained in
new situations. For example, the strategies and rela-
tionships commonly used in the design of a structural
system will be different from those used in determin-
ing the arrangement of elements in a particular system,
but in each case the rules must be modified to accom-
modate the details of the particular problems to be
solved.15 Something of this sort seems to be required to
explain the use of previous experience in solving en-
tirely new problems (as opposed to simply copying old
solutions), and indeed how design or problem solving
is possible at all (PETRIE, 1979). Whether it si more use-
ful to view the generation of new heuristics as the def-
inition of a new (sub)domain or the adaptation of an
existing heuristic is an interesting question. The latter
course has been adopted here to highlight the distinc-
tion between operations over domains (reasoning by
analogy) and operations within domains (adaptation
of existing heuristics). We have argued elsewhere (Lo-
GAN, 1987) both of these operations can be considered
forms of reasoning by analogy carried out at different
levels.
At its simplest the core can be seen as simply repre-
senting all that a designer knows about a particular
class of problems. More generally the core represents
some compromise between the number of heuristics
required to adequately cover a domain (and the associ-
ated overhead in remembering and searching for any
particular heuristic), and the effort involved in adapt-
ing a small number of general rules to a wide variety of
situations (or reinventing the wheel). We further hy-
pothesise that such specialisations, or more generally
«adaptions» of existing heuristics, are necessary in all
goal directed heuristic systems, and that the develop-
ment of these problem specific heuristics is the motiva-
tion for analysis through synthesis, and underlies the
process of understanding the structure of a design
problem identified above as central to the design proc-
ess.'
The definition of a design problem can be viewed
as a point in n x m dimensional space —that is, as a
specification for an heuristic which will achieve a giv-
en level of «performance» in a given situation (typical-
ly an heuristic which has a reasonable chance of pro-
14. Note that this conclusion is not dependent on the de-
tails of the appropriateness vs. situation curves, but rests on the
much more general notion that any approach to problem solving
is restricted to some (limited) range of problems.
15. Note that these «core heuristics» do not necessarily
have to have shown themselves useful in a wide range of situa-
tions; there exist some specialised but very powerful heuristics
which are useful in recurring problems.
16. The formation of new heuristics is also closely related
to the formation and use of analogies in the process of «reason-
ing by analogy». This is discussed in more detail in the next sec-
tion.
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viding the «right» answer to the current problem). The
process of adapting an existing heuristic can be viewed
graphically as moving its characteristic function left or
right to peak in a different situation.17 This process of
adaption can be seen as a natural extension of the
«central assumption of the theory of heuristics» pre-
sented in the previous section: i.e., if an heuristic H
was (or would have been) useful in situation S then it
is likely that heuristics similar to H will be useful in
situations similar to 5.
Several authors (HiLUER & LEAMAN, 1974; STEAD-
MAN, 1979) have argued that there exist cultural stere-
otypes or «templates» which form the basis of design
solutions in a way which could be considered analo-
gous to the core heuristics discussed above. HILLIER &
LEAMAN (1974; 1976) have characterised this process
as one of the elaboration and modification of cultural
stereotypes or «templates». They argue that the de-
signer is situated in
a richly connected universe whose connections are
those dissimilar domains that must be related in design;
activity and space, psychology and climate and so on.
These structures are embedded in the language the de-
signer uses and in the instrumental set —the technolo-
gies or kits of parts and typical design solutions to
which his systems of representation refer (HILLIER &
LEAMAN, 1974). Even to name an architectural prob-
lem —say «design a school»— implies a whole range
of solutions which will be more or less immediately
activated by the designer's prestructures. These struc-
tures form an evolving typology of standard solutions
to recurring problems in design, modified by the de-
signer's experience, ideology and the physical, social,
and cultural environments which form the context of
design. In this view design is seen as the process of dis-
covering
the appropriate transformation or «unfolding» of pre-
structures in relation to the constraints imposed by the
environment of the problem (HILLIER 8c LEAMAN, 1974).
Both the transmission and transformation of prestruc-
tures form a process of elaboration and discovery
which underlies the active formation of relationships
and within which every solution may be unique.
Similarly SCHÜN (1988) argues that designers make
use of «design rules» to «reason their way to moves,
draw out consequences of possible moves [and] make
and evaluate design decisions». Rules are derived from
types. Types function as leading ideas to generate se-
quences of design experiments including «chains of
reasoning, consideration of possible moves, detection
of consequences and implications and choices». They
guide the selection of rules, provide the information
necessary for their application and provide the basis
for challenging and correcting them. Rules are seen as
contingent and contextual; they are held tentatively
and are subject to exceptions and critical modification.
However Schòn argues that while designers do share
rules, different designers also use different rules. While
some rules may be common to many designers (and
may determine the form individual development can
take), designers develop many individual strategies for
solving problems as a result of their education, profes-
sional experience, etc.
In all these views, design is seen as the modification
or refinement of the designers' general codes and rela-
tionships within the context of the current problem.
More generally we can see the problem of design as
one of learning how to develop these basic prestruc-
tures to solve a particular problem. Indeed, as has al-
ready been noted, the development of such an under-
standing of the structure of the problem is the objective
of the process we have termed «analysis-through-syn-
thesis».
7. Induction and rule formation
In this section we attempt to develop a model of the
learning process described above within the frame-
work of the model of design outlined in previous sec-
tions. In particular we attempt to clarify the role of in-
duction in the formation of relationships between
criteria and its relationship to the process of theory
formation. In doing so we shall try to show that in
closing the cycle of abduction, deduction and induc-
tion, the model proposed by MARCH (1976) can be
viewed as a simple model of the design process (or
more precisely the process of analysis-through-synthe-
17. This can be reinterpreted as finding a relationship which
will link some solution space to a given criterion space; or in
object level terms, finding a relationship which structures the
concepts comprising the «problem domain».
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sis), and hence of the development of the designer's
prestructures or solution strategies.
March's model is based on the work of the Ameri-
can philosopher C. S. Peirce. Peirce takes the Aristote-
lian syllogism:
x is y; y is z; hence x is z
as typifying deductive or analytic reasoning; the appli-
cation of a general rule (y is z) to a particular case (x is
y) to give a logically determined result (x is z). The de-
ductive syllogism is based on the concept of necessary
truth; that is that the facts presented in the premises
could not under any imaginable circumstances be true
without involving the truth of the conclusions. More
simply, deduction can be considered the inference of a
result from a case and a rule. However Peirce argues
that inductive or synthetic reasoning, being something
more than the application of a general rule to a partic-
ular case, can never be reduced to this form and he
goes on to develop two further modes of reasoning
which he terms abduction and induction. Neither of
these forms of inference are logically determinate. Ab-
duction reflects the reasoner's presumption that a cer-
tain phenomenon exists to account for his observa-
tions, given that a particular theory holds. Abduction
is the inference of a case from a rule and a result. In-
duction mirrors the reasoner's search for a law to ac-
count for the regularities among phenomena, and is
responsible for engendering new habits of thought. In-
duction is the inference of a rule from a case and a re-
sult.
March relates the three forms of reasoning pro-
posed by Peirce to the context of design in terms of
their results.
1. The creation of a case or «composition» which
is accomplished by abductive reasoning.
2. The prediction of results or a «decomposition»
comprising the characteristics of the design which
emerge from an analysis of the whole composition, ac-
complished by deduction.
3. The derivation of rules or «suppositions», an
idea, a theory, or in the modern usage a model, a type,
accomplished by induction.
March argues that the designer uses his previous
experience and knowledge of solution types in an at-
tempt to produce a solution which satisfies the prob-
lem criteria. Such a speculative design cannot be deter-
mined logically because the mode of reasoning in-
volved is essentially abductive. It can only be inferred
conditionally from our state of knowledge and the
available evidence. Deductive inference is then used to
predict measures of expected performance by the ap-
plication of further models and theories to the particu-
lar design proposal. As the design proceeds new rela-
tionships and criteria are added which may critically
augment the original set in the previous abductive
phase. In the inductive stage the design and its predict-
ed characteristics are used to infer new generalisations
and suppositions. General rules are refined in the con-
text of the current design solution as induction criticis-
es the original hypothesis from the abductive phase
and provides more discriminating tools for the next
round of the cycle. In doing so it evaluates.
In itself a design, or rather the set of pertinent char-
acteristics by which it is perceived, has no value. It as-
sumes relative value through comparison with other
designs both existing and entertained, as well as with
the environment as a whole. Indeed evaluation assumes
that suppositions about worth, preference and desira-
bility can be inferred. It is these suppositions that form
the basis of the abductive phases of designing. That is
to say the models required to produce design alterna-
tives are value laden (MARCH, 1976).
March characterises this as an iterative process in
which there are constant refinements and redefinitions
of characteristic, design, and suppositions as the solu-
tion evolves. The model is envisaged as
representing a critical learning process, in that state-
ments inferred at later stages may be used to modify
those used in earlier stages, and thus to stimulate other
paths of exploration (MARCH, 1976).
However given the large number of criteria which
form the problem definition it is unlikely that the cur-
rent problem will be exactly similar in all respects to
any of the previously solved problems which form the
basis of the designer's prestructures. Indeed it can be
argued that rules are inherently fuzzy in defining a re-
lation between two sets of concepts at a higher level of
abstraction than that of either the individual cases or
results subsumed by the rule. It therefore seems unlike-
ly that at the level of its application (as opposed to its
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level of definition), any rule will be a perfect «fit» for a
given set of criteria, as the concepts involved in rule
definition can be seen as labels of fuzzy sets defined by
a membership function.18 The means to solve the prob-
lem will not exist and must be created. We will now
consider this process in more detail.
7.1. Learning and analogy
In a sense all reasoning can be seen as what might be
loosely termed reasoning by analogy or reasoning from
similar cases.19 In reality both situations and the rela-
tionships between them are inherently fuzzy. Neither
can be completely characterised and our everyday in-
ferences must rely on the various relations of similarity
between the current situation and the previous experi-
ence we are using as a justification for our conclusions.
We continually adapt existing rules from the domain
of interest (or indeed any other domains which are in
some way considered relevant) to the current situation.
It is this adaption which we shall argue can be viewed
as a form of learning.
The designer begins by assuming that a rule which
worked in a similar situation, or a rule similar to it,
will work in the current situation. (This is in effect a
revised version of the «central assumption» underly-
ing Lenat's «second order theory of heuristics»: that
«in a complex, knowledge-rich, incompletely-under-
stood world, it is frequently useful to behave as if ap-
propriateness [action, situation] is continuous and
time-invariant».) Of course this approach is unlikely
to give a completely satisfactory answer, but it pro-
vides a starting point for the exploration of the impli-
cations of a particular solution in terms of the relation-
ships between criteria.20 Subsequent modifications
bring the relationship closer to the current problem.
No relationship can be characterised in absolute terms
as «core» or «problem specific». Both generic solu-
tions and solutions to previously solved problems will,
in general, have to be adapted to the current problem
context. Rather the process is recursive in involving a
series of successive approximations to the required re-
lationship.21 From this viewpoint learning by discov-
ery can be seen as the refinement of such an analogy;
the discovery of the errors and omissions in the initial
model and to what extent the structure of the new do-
main does in fact resemble the structure of the domain
which provided the initial analogy.
To simplify the exposition we shall assume that
some appropriate rule has been found or generated,
i.e., we shall start with the assumption that a rule has
been found which matches the current result (abduc-
tion) or case (deduction), and we shall restrict our at-
tention to the adaption or refinement of a rule to a giv-
en situation. More general cases await a more detailed
treatment of analogy. Learning within a domain can be
viewed as a particular case of adaption or refinement
of analogies or guesses where there already exists a rich
collection of similar relationships, which differ only
slightly from the current situation (e.g. which are valid
over slightly differing ranges of problem criteria) to
serve as a basis for our conjectures.22
7.2. Maintaining consistency
in the problem model
Implicit in this view of learning as successive refine-
ment is the idea of some kind of independent check on
the success or otherwise of a proposed rule. We require
some non-tautological way of assessing how well a
case (and hence a rule) achieves a goal, or conversely
how well a rule predicts a (known) result from a given
case. If there is only a single relationship linking two
18. It also implies that the alternative solutions resulting
from the application of a rule will satisfy the wider context of
the rule criterion to differing degrees, and evaluation of a case
within this context can be interpreted as the redefinition of the
membership function of a fuzzy set of solutions in the context of
a particular set of problem requirements.
19. This of course includes the three forms of inference iden-
tified by March. The perfect match required between a rule and
a case or a case and a result can be seen as special cases of a
more general fuzzy matching procedure.
20. This is the motivation underlying much of the process
of analysis-through-synthesis identified in section 3. The succes-
sive refinement of rules can be seen as a further corollary of the
designer's inability to consider all the aspects of a design prob-
lem simultaneously.
21. PETRIE (1979) has argued that the use of analogy is basic
to all learning, maintaining that it is epistemologically necessary
in relating the unknown and familiar.
22. Although we shall only consider adaption within a giv-
en domain here we have argued elsewhere (LOGAN, 1987) that
the techniques presented below are equally relevant to the pro-
duction of analogies, and that the refinement of techniques or
solution strategies (what might be termed «between designs»
learning), also proceeds through trial and error guided by heu-
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sets of concepts we have no independent means of as-
sessing the result of applying the rule. In any particular
situation cases and results derived using the rule are, in
a sense, correct by definition. More generally such a
relationship is difficult to modify or adapt to a partic-
ular situation as no means exists of determining
whether a series of modifications is converging on the
desired relationship. In practice rules usually form part
of an interdependent system of relationships which to-
gether comprise the body of knowledge associated
with a domain. Different rules express different con-
ceptualisations of the relationships within a domain.
Some relationships will be specialised for generating
hypotheses, while others will be intended to be used
analytically. Each individual rule will have a particular
set of attributes which determine its range, reliability,
accuracy, speed etc. and will be linked to other rules
with different attributes (more accurate but slower,
etc.).
Thus the performance of any one relationship can
be determined using some other relationship from the
domain which is in some sense considered more relia-
ble or appropriate in the current situation. For exam-
ple, existing analytical (deductive) models can be used
to check the performance of an heuristic by inferring
the consequences of a proposed solution hypothesis.
Similarly initial assessments based on simple rules of
thumb can be checked using more detailed (and more
accurate) relationships as more data becomes availa-
ble. Conversely existing abductive models (in the form
of examples or case-result pairs) can be used to assess
the performance of a proposed (deductive) simulation
model, by comparing the predicted result with the pre-
viously recorded values. In general the utility of per-
formance of a rule, and our confidence in it (or more
precisely in the results of using the rule in a particular
situation), will be a complex function of the purpose
of the rule, previous experience in the domain, the data
available and the time available for its use, etc.
In what follows, we will model heuristics as condi-
tionals of the form
A \ , . . ., An <- Bi , . . ., Bm
where A\, . . . , An are the condition/s and BI, . . . , Bm
are the action/s. This approach has the advantage of
preserving the monotonicity of logical inference and
allows us to work within a standard logical framework
(see LOGAN, 1987 for details). We will distinguish be-
tween deductive rules of the form
A(f(xi, . . . , *„))
and abductive rules23
A(x) <- Bi(fi(
, . . . , Bn(xn)
), . . . , Bn(fn(x))
according to the relations of functional dependency
between the criteria (LOGAN, 1989).24 Rules with no
function terms, e.g. A(x) <- B(x), are both abductive
and deductive in the sense defined above. Note that
both sets of rules can be used abductively and deduc-
tively. Given a rule A(x) <— B(f(x)) and an hypothesis
B(f(a)) we can derive A(a) as required by the defini-
tion of abduction. This distinction is more a question
of how the relationships are conceptualised and how
they are typically used, rather than constituting a basic
addition to the framework outlined by March.
Typically each set of rules will only be consistent
for a limited range of values, and in general there is no
guarantee that any given subset will be consistent for
any range of values. For example, the rules
and
A(g(x)) <-B(x)
A(x)«- B(fi(x))
may be consistent for certain sets of values m < x < n
but not for others x < m, x > n where a different rule
such as A(x) <— B(fï(x)) may be required to maintain
consistency. This context dependency can be expressed
explicitly in the form of «context switches»; literals
which have to be true for the rule to be used. For ex-
ample, the rule
23. We have not adopted the conventional practice of de-
noting an «heuristic» (in the sense of an abductive relationship)
as an inverse conditional; i.e. a relationship of the form A(x) -»
Bi(/i(*))> • • •, Bn(fn(x)). Within a conventional first-order frame-
work the meaning of a statement such as, for example, Area
(x, u) -» Length(x, f(u)), Width(x, f(u)) is that if the area of AC is
u then it is logically necessary that it's length and width be f(u).
This means we can't represent alternative ways of deriving the
length and width of a room unless we are willing to specify mu-
tually exclusive sets of situations in which they are appropriate.
To do otherwise entails either reinterpreting the semantics of the
conditional or the introduction of modal operators.
24. More generally rules of both types can be either heuris-
tic (in that the results of their use cannot be guaranteed correct
in all situations) or algorithmic.
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A(x) <— B(fi(x)) / \ x < n / \ x > m
will only be used if x is in the range m - n. (If there are
no assertions regarding the value of x within the cur-
rent problem model, a constraint limiting it to this
range will form part of the hypothesis.)
7.3. An example: generating a valid hypothesis
The problem of, for example, generating a valid hy-
pothesis can be reformulated within this framework as
that of finding an abductive rule which is consistent
over the range of the goal criterion relative to the sub-
set of relevant (deductive or abductive) rules which to-
gether define the problem dependent subtheory for the
domain. For example, in attempting to achieve some
criterion A(a) a designer may use a relationship such as
A(g(x)) <- B(x)
A(x) <-B(f(x)) (1)
representing a rule of thumb, previous example, etc. to
generate an hypothesis, or case
•B(f(a)) (2)
This is essentially the process of abduction: the re-
duction of a set of abstract constraints (expressed as a
series of atomic propositions) to some set of simpler
constraints by using the relationships embodied in the
composite propositions as production rules. The prob-
lem state containing the,criterion A (a) is transformed
into a more detailed one containing the additional as-
sertion B(f(a)) . The resulting expanded set of criteria,
if achieved, would result in the attainment of the con-
straint denoted by the higher level concept. In concep-
tualising the problem in terms of a relationship be-
tween these two criteria the designer has already
determined the overall form of the solution.25 Any spe-
cific design solution is defined by the assignment of a
particular value to the concept B(x).
Once specified, each new partial solution is checked
against the criteria or constraints used in generating all
previous partial solutions. In particular it is checked
against the relationships forming the subtheory for the
current domain. For example, a more accurate rule
with higher reliability but which is difficult to invert
can be used to determine the success of the proposed
hypothesis in achieving the desired criterion. For ex-
ample, from the rule.
and the hypothesis
B(f(a))
we can derive the result
A(g(f(a)))
(3)
(2)
(4)
This is essentially the process of deduction. In the
context of the model developed above deductive infer-
ence can be viewed as the determination of the impli-
cations or emergent properties of the current problem
description based on the functional dependencies be-
tween concepts. As the solution develops new higher
level propositions become derivable from the state-
ments defining the current problem. Typically this en-
tails the prediction of one or more of the performances
or characteristics of the design from some subset of its
attributes.
In many cases the hypothesis may not achieve the
required criterion value i.e. A(a) * A(g(f(a})) or g*f~ l
at a, or it may fail to achieve some one of the other
criteria such as C(b), i.e.
and
B(f(a)),C(h(x))<-B(x)\-C(h(f(a)))
C(h(f(a))) * C(b)
or both. More generally an hypothesis fails to attain
the desired criterion value if the result predicted by the
deductive <cu\eg( f (a ) ) is outwith the range required for
attainment of the goal i.e. g(f(a)) < a\ or g(f(a)) > ai,
where a\ - ar denotes the range of criterion values
which would result in the attainment of the goal. That
is, the values of the goal and objective together with
some integrity constraint imply an inconsistency. In
formal terms we can represent this as
A(a), A(g(f(a)))
together with
25. We shall ignore the problem of finding or generating this
relationship and limit our consideration to the variation in the
value of the criterion f (a).
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-,(A(x) A A(y) A Diff(x, y))
implies an inconsistency. In a sense we can regard the
appropriateness of the abductive rule as inversely pro-
portional to the «distance» between the goal and the
deductively derived result.26 This hypothetico-deduc-
tive cycle underlies the analysis-through-synthesis de-
sign methodology outlined in section 3, in which solu-
tions are proposed to discover their implications in
terms of other criteria. In a sense abduction could be
said to subsume deduction in that the role of deductive
inference can be seen as simply determining the impli-
cations of proposals with respect to constraints, guid-
ing the transition between states and ensuring their
consistency.
In reality, of course, the process is rather more com-
plicated. Whether an hypothesis attains a given criteri-
on value is intrinsically context dependent in being at
least potentially dependent on the values of all the oth-
er criteria forming the problem model. The attainment
of a goal by any given criterion value is dependent on
(amongst other things) what is possible in terms of the
criterion in the current context, the sensitivity of the
criterion value to minor design changes and the impli-
cations of such changes for other criteria. The designer
dynamically redefines the satisficing level for each cri-
terion, and hence the performance level which must be
attained by any hypothesis, in response to the current
problem context. Lower criterion values may be ac-
cepted if the original goals are found to be unattaina-
ble in the context of the current solution, or if their
attainment would have unacceptable consequences for
other criteria.27 While the simple view of deduction
and goal attainment presented above is incapable of
modelling this process of dynamic goal redefinition
(and many other things), we believe it is an adequate
model of a failure to achieve a goal, and hence can give
some insight into the process of rule formation.
As the design develops the designer learns more
about the problem and the solution as new aspects of
the problem become apparent, and the conflicts inher-
ent in his view of the problem are revealed. The de-
signer uses this increased understanding to generate
new structures and relationships. The rules or problem
transformations which form the basis of abduction
and deduction are continually refined and modified as
the design progresses. The design and its derived crite-
ria are used to infer new generalisations and relation-
ships better adapted to the current problem context
(for example, by modifying the criterion values or in-
troducing constraints requiring that if a particular so-
lution is to be used in the current context other design
criteria must take certain values). This integration is
the step Peirce termed «induction».
Thus from a case
and result
B(f(a))
A(g(f(a)))
(2)
(4)
derived within the context of the current problem we
can infer a new rule, say
A(x) (5)
which subsumes both Eqn. (2) and Eqn. (4) and hope-
fully is better adapted to producing hypotheses within
the range of the criterion value A(a). In general there
will be many such rules and it will be necessary to se-
lect between them on the basis of some criterion (sim-
plicity, plausibility, etc.). However we will not consid-
er these problems further here. Like abduction,
induction is not logically determinate. A newly in-
ferred relationship cannot be guaranteed to be consist-
ent with either the derived criteria or the set of hypoth-
eses forming the current problem state. A derived
relation is said to be valid if it is consistent with the set
of constraints which constitute the current problem
model, and irredundant if it allows the derivation of
new consequences and/or hypotheses. As such it sub-
sumes both deduction and abduction as necessary to
the determination of its consistency.
The cycle then begins again. This new rule can be
used to generate a new hypothesis which forms the
basis of a more detailed exploration of the problem,
leading to the derivation of new criterion values and
the generation of further hypotheses. Hopefully the
26. Indeed we can view the utility of a rule in attaining some
goal criterion in these terms. The function appropriateness (ac-
tion, situation) becomes the inverse of the objective —the result
of taking some action in some situation expressed in terms of
problem criteria rather than meta-level properties. However we
shall not pursue these ideas further here.
27. These problems are discussed in more detail in LOGAN
(1987).
226
Brian Logan
deductive and abductive models will tend to «con-
verge» as the structure of the problem is understood.
In the simple example above this happens when some
f* = g~l over the range of the goal criterion, i.e.
g(f*(a)) =a. If no modification of Eqn. (1) leads to suc-
cess then either the problem is overconstrained, (i.e. a
basic conflict exists within the criteria forming the cur-
rent problem context), and the solution must be modi-
fied or the constraints relaxed, or the original (meta)-
hypothesis of using Eqn. (1) was flawed (e.g. an
inappropriate analogy), and the (meta)-rule that lead
to the generation of Eqn. (1) must be modified accord-
ingly. MARCH (1976) has argued that the phases follow
one another in the iterative sequence abduction-deduc-
tion-induction with constant refinements and redefini-
tions of characteristics, design, and relations as the so-
lution evolves. However while this is the general
direction of the argument there is no logical necessity
for any particular operation to follow any other; it is
common, for example, to defer evaluation until sever-
al decisions have been made or to consider several hy-
potheses simultaneously, and in general a simple itera-
tive process is inadequate to represent the complexity
of design.
This cycle of abduction-deduction-induction is a
learning process. In this view «learning» is seen as the
formalisation (through induction) of the understand-
ing of the relationship between an action (or more gen-
erally a situation) and its consequences. In design this
takes the form of learning about critical relationships
and possible forms as the solution evolves. Between
generic solutions planning is less a search for the best
than an exploration of the compromises that give suf-
ficient solutions. These explorations help the designer
appreciate which requirements may be most readily
achieved. Learning more is the most important part of
this process, and redefinition of the problem and solu-
tion can only result if more knowledge about them is
acquired. The «right» abductive relationship is one
which not only achieves the original (local) goal, but
which achieves this goal in the context of the current
problem. The resulting abductive function f* repre-
sents the designer's understanding of the structure of
the problem; it embodies the knowledge of how to
achieve the goal in the context of the problem, i.e. the
modifications which must be made to the standard so-
lution for it to work in the context of the current prob-
lem.
8. Conclusion
In this paper we have tried to relate two of the main
approaches to design found in the design theory litera-
ture —that design is a knowledge-based process and
that design is a learning process— in an attempt to ex-
plain why design happens the way it does. Starting
with a small number of (hopefully) plausible assump-
tions about the nature of design problems and the lim-
itations of design knowledge, we have developed a the-
oretical model which tries to account for some of the
results from empirical studies of the design process. In
particular, we have tried to explain why even in the
case of reasonably simple problems designers find it
necessary to refine and extend their knowledge in the
context of the current problem and how in doing so
they come to understand the pattern of relationships
between criteria which together define the structure of
the problem. By embedding our model of design
knowledge within the framework of the three logical
operators proposed by March we have tried to show
how the development of design knowledge might pro-
ceed. The refinement of an heuristic through a process
of successive approximation can be viewed as a very
crude model of (or perhaps a metaphor for), what hap-
pens when a designer begins to «understand» the
structure of a problem, in terms of the relationships
between the problem criteria. The resulting hypotheti-
co-deductive process can be seen as a natural conse-
quence of the need to refine and adapt a set of basic or
core relationships to a given problem, and forms the
context of a learning process through which designers
refine their knowledge both within and between design
problems.
The use of heuristics to model design knowledge is
not meant to imply any ontological commitment, e.g.
that the rules used by designers can be made explicit or
even that such rules exist. Rather heuristics provide a
useful framework for exploring certain assumptions
about design knowledge; any equivalent representa-
tion such as «prestructures» or «prototypes» would do
equally well. Indeed, we would argue that the analysis
presented above applies to any knowledge-based view
of design, irrespective of whether design knowledge is
represented as heuristics, problem transformations or
prototypes. Nor do we claim that March's abduction-
deduction-induction model of the design process has
any psychological validity. Rather the intention is to
place some broad constraints on how such a process of
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rule formation might work. However we would argue
that even such a limited model is useful in gaining
some insight into the role of learning in design and that
it can provide a useful framework for future work.
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